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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of the present paper is to test the hypothesis that risk has an impact on inequality. 
Many studies investigating the behaviour of farmers under risk have concluded that poorer 
farmers tend to reduce their risk by reducing proportionally more their expected gross margin 
than the wealthier ones because they are more risk averse and less protected against risk. This 
would be the driving force behind the distributional impact of risk. Here we propose a direct 
way to test this hypothesis by decomposing income inequality in its different sources in order 
to understand the importance of risk compared to other factor in explaining inequality. We 
applied the method to a dataset of repeated cross-sectional data on the Irish agriculture and we 
found that risk explains up to 20% of inequality once other factors are controlled for. 
Furthermore, we have seen that this impact has risen over time but that this increase could be 
stopped by mitigating the impact of risk on farmers with proper risk management tools. 
Lastly, we observe that this rise coincides with the rise in market risk linked to lowering of 
price support implemented under the reforms of pillar I of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). It is therefore likely that the distributional impact of risk is going to be high over the 
next decade because the planned lowering of market supports under the next reform of the 
CAP.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a context were farmers’ risk exposure increases over time due notably to a growing price 
volatility, it is important to understand better the link between risk and economic inequality 
because most major agricultural policies have a direct impact on risk while equity is an 
important criterion of their success. Furthermore, inequality might be a direct threat to the 
goal’s delivery of the policy. Many links have been drawn between risk and inequality in the 
literature. On a formal level, Atkinson (Atkinson, 1970)  borrowed directly from the theory of 
behaviour under risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970, Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1971) to decipher 
the moral judgments embedded in different inequality indexes while, on a pragmatic level, 
several authors have suggested that risk increases inequality as poorer households are more 
vulnerable to adverse shocks (Babcock and Hennessy, 1996, Dercon, 1996, Ravallion, 1988). 
More recently, Ligon and Schechter have included inequality as one of the components of 
their newly created household vulnerability index (Ligon and Schechter, 2003). We focus in 
the present paper on the causal link between risk and economic inequality and we contribute 
to the understanding of this dynamic by estimating its strength.  
 
There are different types of risk threatening a farm business (Hardeker et al., 2004): market 
risks (e.g. price volatility, demand shocks), production risk (e.g. weather variability, pest and 
animal diseases etc.), institutional risk (e.g. change in policy), financial risk (e.g. change in 
interests charged on the debt of the farm) and personal risk (e.g. health, accidents, divorce). In 
general, risk tends to reduce profit because farmers are risk averse (Antle, 1987, Binswanger, 
1980, Chavas and Holt, 1996) and tend therefore to swap expected profit against lower risk 
(Sandmo, 1971). Indeed, a farmer chooses the range of profit he might expect when he 
chooses his input: if he borrows largely to invest in land, buildings stock, and new 
machineries, he might expect to increase his next year profit while taking the risk of suffering 
heavier losses if the price turns out to be low (market risk) or if an epidemic hits his herd or 
poor weather reduces yields (production risk). However, if he prefers a conservative 
production plan, his exposure to risk diminishes as well as his expected profit. This is the 
reason why we might conceive lower profit as the cost of risk. Other examples include 
reluctance to invest in new technologies, to adopt new farming practices or tendency to favour 
diversification upon economy of scale. This trade-off between risk and profit affects both the 
short term and the long term competitiveness of the farm.  
 
If all farmers tended to react similarly to risk, then risk wouldn’t have any impact on the 
distribution of income: everyone would be simply poorer than if everyone was risk neutral. 
However, empirical evidence shows that farmers exhibit declining absolute risk aversion 
(DARA) (Binswanger, 1980, Chavas and Holt, 1996). DARA means that poorer farmers are 
more risk averse which explains why they tend to renounce to a greater proportion of their 
expected profit for a given reduction in risk. Furthermore, richer farmers have access to a 
whole set of risk management solutions such as credit, insurance and savings. Therefore, 
while bigger, richer and less risk averse farmers will be able to make the right investment 
decision to profit from market opportunities, expand their business and increase their profit, 
smaller and poorer farmers will tend to be stuck at the bottom of the distribution, unable to 
invest because of credit constraints or because of fear of being exposed to risk perceived 
through a magnifying glass. This process tends to stretch out the distribution of income, 
increasing the overall level of inequality.  
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To sum-up, theory suggests that risk increases inequality because poorer farmers are more 
affected by risk due to their greater risk aversion and due to their lack of risk management 
tools. However, we still have no evidence of the severity of the impact of risk compared to 
other triggers of inequality. Is it sufficiently important to be taken into account in policy 
design? The goal of the present paper is to shed some lights on this question.  
 
Our strategy is to rely on the large literature on inequality decomposition (Bourguignon, 1979, 
Shorrocks, 1982, Shorrocks, 1984, Fields and Yoo, 2000, Oaxaca, 1973, Blinder, 1973, 
Shorrocks, 1983). Most studies in inequality decomposition have focused on the difference in 
revenues between male and female or on the impact of education on the distribution of 
income. Several studies have been conducted on these topics, most of them based on the 
human capital model (Lemieux, 2002). More recently, Fields has developed a decomposition 
method to explain the role of various factors in the changes of inequality (Fields and Yoo, 
2000) while Shorrocks has developed a method based on the Shapley value (Shorrocks, 
1999). Several authors have applied those models to the farming sector in developing 
countries (Morduch and Sicular, 2002, Adams, 2002, Bourguignon et al., 2001, Wan and 
Zhou, 2005) and in Ireland (Hynes et al., forthcoming, Hynes and O'Donoghue, forthcoming). 
 
The last piece of the puzzle is to estimate the risk exposure of farmers. We use for this 
purpose the square and the cube of the residuals of a stochastic production function (Just and 
Pope, 1979, Antle, 1983, Di Falco and Chavas, 2006, Di Falco and Chavas, 2009). As we will 
show later, this capture two features of risk: the conditional variance and skewness of the 
distribution of profit. The variance relates intuitively to the uncertainty about the expected 
profit as it is the scale of the distribution of all possible profits given the observed inputs’ 
choices while negative (positive) skeweness describe the presence of downside (“upside”) 
risk. Lastly, we also use a diversification index (Berry, 1971) in order to capture 
diversification strategies and economies of scale. 
 
Based on the methods of Shorrocks and Fields (Fields and Yoo, 2000, Shorrocks, 1982), we 
analyze the role of risk in explaining Irish farmers’ gross margin inequality controlling for a 
set of classical variables used in income generating function. Ireland is an interesting case 
study because of the diversity of its agriculture, its exposure to international price volatility 
and its direct link to weather shock through its pasture-based cattle-herding system. 
Furthermore Irish farmers have been exposed to increasing risk over time, mostly because of a 
greater volatility in prices and the decoupling of production subsidies. In section 2, we present 
the methodology; in section 3, the data; in section 4, the results and in section 5 we conclude. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
The impact of risk on inequality is complex. As Ravallion put it, “the existence of income risk 
need not to imply that the distribution of income change over time” (Ravallion, 1988) and the 
variability in the level of wealth over time might be due to income mobility as well as to risk. 
When it comes to the inequality between farmers, changes in inequality over time might be 
due to changes in inputs’ uses as well as changes in inputs’ return due to weather events or 
output prices changes (Lemieux, 2002). Several techniques have been developed over the last 
two decades to deal with these caveats. We follow the methodology of Fields and Yoo (Fields 
and Yoo, 2000).  
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The method of Fields and Yoo (Fields and Yoo, 2000) has three steps. In the first step, we 
decompose the sources of inequality in order to obtain the contribution of each variable to 
inequality. This contribution is called the factor’s inequality weight. These inequality weights 
are “the proportions of total inequality attributed to each source of income”(Shorrocks, 1982). 
For instance, if risk has a factor inequality weight of 30%, this means that 30% of inequality 
is explained by risk. The second step is to decompose the change of these inequality weights 
from year to year. The goal is to know what triggers the changes: a change of the impact of 
risk on wealth, a change in the inequality in wealth or a change in the inequality in risk? The 
last step consists in analysing the contribution of each factor to the change in economic 
inequality. To sum-up, the method devised by Fields and Yoo and grounded on the work of 
Shorrocks (Shorrocks, 1982) allows estimating the contribution of each factor to inequality in 
each year, the source of changes of these contributions between years and the impact of each 
factor on the changes in inequality. 
 
The first step is based on the model of Shorrocks to decompose inequality (Shorrocks, 1982). 
The powerful result of Shorrocks is that, given six assumptions (listed in Appendix A), the 
factors’ inequality weights will be independent of the inequality index chosen. In other terms, 
once we have chosen an inequality index satisfying the six conditions (as do the Gini index, 
Atkinson index and all entropy family indexes), “the relative importance of different income 
components is independent of the choice of inequality measure” (Shorrocks, 1982). This 
elegant method overcome therefore the challenge of justifying the choice of a particular 
ethical rule embodied in any particular inequality index and it avoids the limitation of 
obtaining results only valid for one index. 
 
The model is based on a standard income generating function: 
 
 
 
where  is the income,  are the coefficient and  is the 
set of explicative variable (  being the error term). Given the six assumptions, the 
contribution of the variable k to inequality will be the same independently of the inequality 
index used. Therefore, we choose as Fields and Yoo the sample variance of gross margin as 
index of inequality as it is easy to handle.  
 
We present below only the major equations being used in the estimation part. The 
mathematical derivation is presented in appendix B. The share of factor k in inequality 
measured by the variance can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
where  is relative factor inequality weight and  is the coefficient of determination 
of the regression of income on the set of explicative variables (see appendix B for more 
details). It is noteworthy to stress again the fact that this expression is valid for the whole set 
of inequality indexes fulfilling the six assumptions (Shorrocks, 1982).  
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The second step of the method tackles the fact that the changes in factors’ inequality weights 
might be due to changes in the coefficients, in the distribution of the explanatory variables or 
in the distribution of income (Fields and Yoo, 2000). Again, the key word is decomposition.  
 
We start by rewriting the relative factor inequality weight, , as: 
 
 
 
Then, we get the contribution of the change of each component to the change in  by 
logarithmically differencing the last expression. By rearranging it, the total change of each 
inequality weight between years is decomposed in its different elements: 
 
 
 
The problem with this specification is that the coefficient  and are both 
determined by . As they cannot be changed independently, this can lead to some 
simultaneity biases. Therefore, Fields and Yoo propose another specification based on the 
assumption of perfect orthogonality between regressors (rarely if ever true in empirical 
dataset). In this case, as all the correlations  between sources of income  are 
zero, we can rewrite the contribution of factor j to inequality simply as : 
 
 
 
Logarithmically differencing and rearranging the expression, the total change of each 
inequality weight between years is now expressed as: 
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It remains an approximation because real world changes are not infinitesimal and because the 
explicative variables are rarely if ever orthogonal to each other. 
 
The third step, the difference question as Field and Yoo call it, consists in analysing the 
impact of each variable on the change in inequality. 
 
We start by observing that given the fact that inequality is the sum of its factors’ inequality 
weights: 
 
 
 
where I() is the inequality index and the subscript 1 refers to the period 1. The change in 
inequality can be rewritten as: 
 
 
Therefore, the change in inequality is: 
 
 
This allows us expressing the contribution of factor j to the change in inequality by: 
 
 
 
As Fields and Yoo stress it,  is as a function of I(.), the index of inequality used. The 
estimated contribution of each factor to the change in inequality is indeed going to vary 
according to which index is used.  
 
To sum-up, the methods pioneered by Shorrocks (Shorrocks, 1982) and developed by Fields 
and Yoo (Fields and Yoo, 2000) allow estimating the contribution of each variable to 
inequality (1
st
 step) and to its change over time (3
rd
 step). Furthermore, the change in each 
factor’s inequality weight can be decomposed between change in the distribution of the 
variable in the population, the change of the effect of this variable on the dependent variable 
(here, the average return of each input in terms of gross margin) and the change of the 
distribution of income (2
nd
 step). We will present now the data on the Irish agriculture and 
some general trends in terms of inequality. 
 
3. ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND DATA 
 
The database, the National Farm Survey (NFS), stretches from 1995 to 2009 and is collected 
by Teagasc, a semi-state research body in the Republic of Ireland. The annual survey is 
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conducted at the NUTS 3 level and covers a representative sample of approximately 1100 
farms per year, representing the approximately 100’000 farmers in Ireland. This survey feeds 
the Farm Accounting Data Network at the European level. The farms stay on average five 
years in the survey and they are classified in 6 categories according to their main source of 
revenues: Dairy, Dairy and other, Cattle, Cattle and other, Sheep, Tillage. 
 
In addition of disposing of a database of very high quality, the interest of using Irish data to 
understand better the link between risk and inequality is the presence of significant market 
and production risk and a relative high level of inequality. Indeed, the Irish agricultural sector 
being export oriented and price-taker, it has been deeply affected by the volatility of the soft 
commodities of the last 3 years. In term of production risk, the Irish agriculture is mainly 
dominated by grass-based cattle herding and is therefore exposed to the variability of the 
weather: adverse weather condition leads to less grass and lower hay harvest, forcing farmers 
to buy more feed and concentrate. The level of gross margin has grown on average from 
€30970 in 1995 to €35130 in 2009 with a maximum of €40880 in 2008. The years 2007-2009 
have known an unprecedented volatility on agricultural commodities markets which lead to 
the boom and bust pattern of average gross margin, closely replicating the price movements. 
 
The inequality in gross margin has been 
relatively high and stable. The Gini index 
oscillates between 0.41 and 0.47 with a 
significant decline at the beginning of the 
period and a gradual increase from 2000 
onward, which culminates in 2008. The 
relative high level of inequality comes from 
the fact that several types of farming coexist 
and that part time and hobby farmers are 
included in the sample along full-time 
business oriented farmers. Therefore, it is 
expected that a large part of the inequality 
between farms comes from inequality in size 
of the farm and in the intensity of the 
production process. We will comment this further in the next section with the results of the 
model. 
 
The amount of capital invested in the farm has been gradually growing from 2003 onward, 
with a sharp rise in 2006 picking in 2008, while the size of farms measured in hectares has 
been mostly constant. In parallel, less and less labour has been employed on the farm (from an 
average of 1.4 full-time workers in 1995 to 1.15 in 2009). Farms became therefore more 
capitalized over time. The summary statistics are in appendix C.  
 
We used as dependent variable the log of gross margin. The explicative variables are: the net 
capital expenditure in thousands of Euros (e.g. major repairs to farm buildings, plant and 
machinery and land improvement), land (utilized agriculture area of the farm in hectares), 
labour (one labour unit is one full time worker on the farm), a series of dummy variables for 
the type of farming (dairy is the base category), a series of dummy variables for the quality of 
soil (3 categories, the best one is the base category), a series of dummies for each of the 8 
administrative regions of Ireland (the base category is the border region), a dummy variable 
for being client of Teagasc farm advisory services and a dummy variable for taking part to the 
Rural Environment Protection Scheme (REPS). 
Figure 1 
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With respect to risk, we use a diversification index expressed as (Berry, 1971): 
 
 
 
The rationale of including a diversification index is to control for economies of scale in 
specialized farms and principally to take into account diversification strategies implemented 
to mitigate exposure to risk. 
 
Lastly we approximate risk faced by farmers by taking the square and the cube of the 
residuals (Antle, 1987, Just and Pope, 1979, Antle, 1983, Di Falco and Chavas, 2006, Groom 
et al., 2008, Franklin et al., 2006). This technique is intuitively simple: risk is the difference 
between the conditional expectation of gross margin and the actual gross margin. By taking 
the square and the cube of the residual, we obtain respectively the variance and the skewness 
of the distribution of the gross margin for each farm.  
 
However, we have to assume that the regression is correctly specified and that farmers’ 
expectations are close to the predicted values of the regression. Furthermore, we have to 
assume that the risk faced by all farmers is homogeneous, namely that the shocks on the 
expected gross margins are drawn from the same distribution (Kamanou and Morduch, 2002). 
This specification captures production risk such as lack of rain, plant and animal diseases, 
pests or localized floods as well as market risk and price risk. Indeed, as each farm has a 
different output mix, even price volatility usually considered as an aggregated risk is going to 
have an idiosyncratic impact on individual farms’ gross margins and will therefore be 
captured in the error terms. 
 
To sum-up, the log of gross margin is regressed against a set of classical explicative variables, 
two proxies for the risk and an index of diversification. We ran an OLS cross-sectional 
regression on each year of the period using heteroskedasticity robust error terms, controlling 
for clustering effects on production system. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
We start by presenting the results of the 15 OLS regressions. We got rid of the outliners and 
over-influential observations (161 from a total of 17383 observations). The tables of estimates 
are in Appendix D. We obtain very high r-squared coefficients (between 0.72 and 0.92) and 
very high levels of significance (most variables are significant at the 0.01 level), which is as 
expected given the large sample size and the quality of the data.  
 
The dummies on the types of farming are all negative, which is expected because the base 
category, the specialist dairy system, is the most profitable farming system in Ireland. The 
dummy on cattle has the biggest negative impact, translating the fact that many farmers 
operating cattle farms are only part-time farmers. The soil quality dummies are also all 
negative, which is expected because the base category is the best one. We also see that capital 
has only a limited impact on gross margin compared to other inputs such as land and labour. 
Both land and labour capture the size of the farms explaining their greater impact on gross 
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margin. The work of Teagasc advisory teams seems to have a positive and important impact 
on gross margin. However, it is likely that farmers who are already more efficient and who 
are more business oriented constitutes a greater proportion of Teagasc’s clients. Part-time 
farmers are indeed unlikely to be willing to pay for such services. Taking part to REPS 
increased gross margin by a significant amount and is quite stable over the period (around 
30% for the six more recent years).  
 
The impact of the diversification of the farms on gross margin has changed over the 15 years 
studied. Although it was positive at the beginning, it becomes progressively a handicap, 
echoing the greater need of specialisation to obtain economies of scale in a market 
environment more and more competitive. Lastly, the impact of variance gain in pragmatic and 
statistic significance as time goes. Although mostly significant only at the 0.08 level until 
2005, it becomes significant at the 0.01 level for the remaining years and have a very negative 
impact. The impact of skewness is mostly positive as a higher level of skewness means that 
the tail of the profit distribution becomes bigger on its right hand-side (higher probability to 
have a “good surprise”). In other terms, greater upside risk lead to higher income and vice-
versa. 
 
Now we turn to the decomposition of inequality in its different sources. The table of results is 
in appendix E. The inequality in capital has only a small impact on the inequality in gross 
margin. This might be explained by the fact that all Irish farms have a good access to capital 
and are therefore at their equilibrium. Land and labour have the greatest factor inequality 
weights of all variables, which is quite logical as land and labour are closely related to the size 
of the farm. Inequality in size naturally leads to inequality in gross margin while bigger and 
more business oriented farms are likely to employ more full-time farmers. The type of 
farming system is the second most important factor explaining inequality. An outflow of 
farms from the specialist dairy system to the “dairy and other” system or to tillage system 
would reduce inequality while the effect would be reversed in the direction of “cattle”, “cattle 
and other” and the sheep system. The geographic location, REPS and Teagasc advisory 
activities have a negligible impact on inequality.  
 
An interesting picture comes out when we look at the variables linked to risk, namely, the 
diversification index, the variance and the skewness of the distribution of gross margin. 
Although the diversification index and the variance have almost no impact until 2005, they 
explain together between 15% and 30% (2008) of the inequality in the four last years. These 
last years have been 
characterized by a high 
level of volatility of 
prices and gross 
margins and the results 
indicate that those risks 
have triggered a 
greater inequality. We 
can infer that more 
diversified farms were 
not able to benefit 
from the rise of 
commodities prices 
while a greater 
variance stretched out 
Figure 2 
11 
 
the distribution of income between business oriented profitable farms quick to respond to 
markets signals and smaller farms too slow to respond to price signals. The effect of skewness 
is by contrast more stable over the whole period. It increases inequality by 4.4% on average 
and 6% if we look only at the years where it did increase inequality, although it has a negative 
impact in 2008 on inequality. In the middle of 2008, the dairy, cattle, pig, sheep, poultry and 
cereal prices picked and started falling down very fast. We can therefore argue that farms who 
had benefited the most from the “upside risk” were more severely hit by the reversal of price 
trends. As these farms were the more business oriented ones, this unexpected reversal of 
prices lead to a decline in inequality. The next graph (figure 2) summarizes the results. We 
have plotted the net effect of each category. The figure doesn’t change much if we compare 
the categories in terms of their absolute impact on inequality. 
 
The change of the factor inequality weights over time is detailed in appendix F. Here we focus 
on the variables linked to risk. Their changes in inequality weights are mostly due to the 
change in their impacts on gross margin (rather than a change in their distribution or a change 
in the gross margin inequality). This brings two important conclusions in terms of policies. 
First of all, providing mechanism which would reduce the impact of risk such as insurances 
would also have an impact on the inequality of revenues. Second, the inequality in revenues 
per-se doesn’t play an important role in the phases of rise. Offering better risk management 
scheme would therefore have some side benefits such as reducing the inequality. 
 
However, we should bring a note of caution before drawing too strong conclusions. Because 
of the joint determination of the coefficients and of the correlations between the dependent 
variables, we used the second method of factors’ inequality weights’ decomposition to get 
these results. As highlighted in the methodology part, this method relies on the assumption 
that the variables are orthogonal to each others, which is difficult to defend particularly 
between variance and skewness as both variables are created from the residuals. Nevertheless, 
it might provide and interesting guide.  
 
We then applied the model to estimate the impact of each variable on the change in inequality 
(table of estimates are in appendix E). The results are less clear cut than the previous ones. 
Although the relative proportions of each variable are quite constant over time, their absolute 
shares as well as the sign of their impact vary a lot between years. Overall, skewness has a big 
impact on the change in inequality while variance and diversification plays a role respectively 
only in the last four and five years of the period. Land and labour are an important factor 
while the type farming is only important when cattle are involved. The soil quality and REPS 
are marginal. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of the present paper was to test the hypothesis that risk has an impact on the 
inequality. Many studies investigating the behaviour of farmers under risk have indeed 
concluded that poorer farmers tend to reduce their risk by reducing proportionally more their 
expected gross margin than the better-off ones because they are more risk averse and less 
protected against risk. This is the reason why risk would increase inequality over time. Here 
we have proposed a direct way to test this hypothesis by decomposing income inequality in its 
different sources. We have found that risk explains up to 20% of inequality once other factors 
are controlled for. Furthermore, we have seen that this impact has risen over time but that this 
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increase could be stopped by mitigating the impact of risk on farmers with proper risk 
management tools.  
 
These results shed also some new lights on past and planned reforms of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Since Agenda 2000, the CAP is divided in two pillars: pillar I 
covers market support measures while pillar II covers rural development and the environment. 
The goals of the reforms of the CAP can be summarized in three points: contributing to the 
stability of the agricultural sector; promoting efficiency and the equal distribution of supports; 
preserving the environment. The problem is that the reforms of pillar I have left so far a big 
loophole in terms of risk management. As farmers are not equal in front of risk, the lowering 
of market supports have had an unequal impact among farmers. Indeed, we have shown that 
risk contributed up to 20% to inequality following the 2005 reforms. At one extreme, the 
increase in market risk could drive out of business most small and medium farms, leaving 
only big farms, which, despite being economically more efficient, might have a more 
damaging impact on the environment and might be less likely to be lured into the voluntary 
agri-environmental schemes of pillar II.  
 
To summarize, the general lessons is that policy makers should take into account the 
distributional impacts of risk in order to mitigate negative spillover effects between the 
planned lowering of price supports under the reforms of pillar I and the success of agri-
environmental policies of pillar II. If affordable risk management tools for small and medium 
farms are not proposed soon, further lowering of market supports might threaten the stability 
of European farms, increase inequality and promote economical efficiency at the cost of 
environmental damage. 
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APPENDIX A: THE SIX ASSUMPTION OF SHORROCKS 
This six assumptions are (Shorrocks, 1982): 
1) The index of inequality, I(GM) is a continuous and symmetric function,  
if and only if , where e=(1,1,...1) and  is the mean of GM. 
2)  is continuous in  where Sk() is the contribution of factor k 
to the gross margin;   where  is 
any permutation of 1, ... K. 
3) Independence of level of aggregation 
 
4) Consistent decomposition:  
5) Population symmetry:  where P is a permutation 
matrix (all individuals are treated symmetrically); Normalization for equal factor 
distribution:  for all  (the contribution of a factor to inequality is 
zero if all individuals receive the same amount from this income source) 
6) Two factor symmetry:  
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APPENDIX B 
The model is based on a standard income generating function: 
 
 
 
Where  is the income,  are the coefficient and  is the 
set of explicative variable (  being the error term).  
 
Following Shorrocks, we rewrite the sample variance,  as: 
 
 
 
where  is the income from source k,  is the correlation between variable j and k 
and  is the standard deviation. Given the six assumptions, we can write the contribution of 
factor K to the variance, , simply as: 
 
 
 
Then, to obtain the relative factor inequality weight, we simply divide by the variance: 
 
 
 
We observe that the impacts of each variable on inequality sum to 100%: 
 
 
 
where the k+2 means that both the constant and the errors terms are take into account. We 
also observe that: 
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Therefore, the share of each regressor  in the inequality, the factor inequality weight, is: 
 
 
 
The second step of the method tackle the fact that the changes in factors’ inequality weights 
might be due to changes in the coefficients, in the distribution of the explanatory variables or 
in the distribution of income (Fields and Yoo, 2000). Again, the key word is decomposition.  
 
We start by rewriting the share of factor k to variance, , as: 
 
 
 
 
Then, we get the contribution of the change of each component to the change in  by 
logarithmically differencing the last expression. Indeed, 
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where  is the percentage rate of change. Then by dividing by , the total change is 
decomposed in its different elements: 
 
 
 
The problem with this specification is that the coefficient  and are both 
determined by . As they cannot be changed independently, this can lead to some 
simultaneity bias. Therefore, Fields and Yoo propose another specification based on the very 
strong assumption that regressors are perfectly orthogonal to each other. Assuming zero 
correlation between the sources of income, the contribution of factor j to inequality is: 
 
 
 
As before, we divide then by the variance of Y in order to obtain the determinant’s factor 
inequality weight: 
 
 
 
Then, by logarithmically differentiating , the rate of change of  and its 
components:  
 
 
 
And then we need only to divide by  to obtain the share of each component in the 
change:  
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It remains an approximation because real world changes are not infinitesimal and because the 
explicative variables are rarely if ever orthogonal to each other. 
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  
capital land labour teagasc REPS system1 system2 system3 system4 system5 system6 soil1 soil2 soil3 divers 
1
9
9
5
 
 
62.35 45.20 1.54 0.41 0.08 0.24 0.22 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.10 0.49 0.40 0.12 0.41 
    111.91 29.00 0.74 0.49 0.28 0.43 0.41 0.29 0.39 0.36 0.30 0.50 0.49 0.32 0.21 
1
9
9
6
 
 
56.81 44.09 1.49 0.48 0.18 0.28 0.19 0.08 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.47 0.42 0.12 0.43 
    112.57 28.00 0.72 0.50 0.39 0.45 0.39 0.26 0.41 0.37 0.28 0.50 0.49 0.32 0.22 
1
9
9
7
 
 
58.70 46.57 1.51 0.48 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.48 0.41 0.10 0.44 
    104.04 28.05 0.69 0.50 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.50 0.49 0.30 0.21 
1
9
9
8
 
 
63.71 46.58 1.48 0.49 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.50 0.41 0.09 0.45 
    116.67 27.43 0.66 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.50 0.49 0.28 0.21 
1
9
9
9
 
 
58.39 46.85 1.44 0.50 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.50 0.41 0.09 0.46 
    121.03 27.63 0.66 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.25 0.50 0.49 0.29 0.22 
2
0
0
0
 
 
84.69 48.31 1.43 0.00 0.34 0.32 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.51 0.40 0.09 0.43 
    151.92 27.81 0.63 0.00 0.47 0.47 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.50 0.49 0.29 0.22 
2
0
0
1
 
 
80.49 50.55 1.45 0.55 0.28 0.35 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.53 0.40 0.08 0.49 
    161.48 29.70 0.66 0.50 0.45 0.48 0.38 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.50 0.49 0.27 0.20 
2
0
0
2
 
 
79.08 48.83 1.37 0.52 0.29 0.31 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.51 0.40 0.09 0.53 
    164.24 29.66 0.62 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.36 0.41 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.50 0.49 0.28 0.20 
2
0
0
3
 
 
72.22 50.00 1.34 0.53 0.30 0.31 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.53 0.38 0.10 0.51 
    138.87 30.80 0.59 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.31 0.29 0.50 0.49 0.30 0.20 
2
0
0
4
 
 
82.81 50.25 1.34 0.53 0.32 0.31 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.52 0.38 0.10 0.51 
    160.58 32.35 0.63 0.50 0.47 0.46 0.34 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.29 0.50 0.49 0.30 0.21 
2
0
0
5
 
 
90.36 49.47 1.30 0.58 0.38 0.30 0.12 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.51 0.38 0.10 0.75 
    174.43 31.58 0.61 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.32 0.41 0.39 0.30 0.26 0.50 0.49 0.30 0.16 
2
0
0
6
 
 
99.66 51.63 1.31 0.61 0.48 0.30 0.11 0.20 0.21 0.10 0.08 0.54 0.38 0.08 0.81 
    196.83 31.73 0.60 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.32 0.40 0.41 0.29 0.28 0.50 0.49 0.27 0.17 
2
0
0
7
 
 
165.34 51.79 1.27 0.67 0.49 0.28 0.09 0.20 0.24 0.10 0.09 0.54 0.38 0.08 0.78 
    302.86 32.67 0.60 0.47 0.50 0.45 0.28 0.40 0.43 0.30 0.29 0.50 0.48 0.27 0.19 
2
0
0
8
 
 
250.42 51.71 1.27 0.61 0.47 0.27 0.08 0.23 0.24 0.09 0.09 0.53 0.38 0.09 0.80 
    485.23 32.81 0.60 0.49 0.50 0.44 0.27 0.42 0.42 0.29 0.29 0.50 0.49 0.28 0.19 
2
0
0
9
 
 
147.80 54.00 1.34 0.58 0.49 0.30 0.07 0.23 0.22 0.09 0.08 0.54 0.38 0.08 0.84 
    278.84 34.59 0.62 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.26 0.42 0.42 0.29 0.28 0.50 0.49 0.27 0.14 
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APPENDIX D: REGRESSION RESULTS 
Regression Results 1995-2002 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) 
capital 8.71e-04
***
 5.05e-04
***
 5.88e-04
***
 3.07e-04
***
 5.02e-04
***
 4.07e-04
***
 2.38e-04
**
 1.43e-04
*
 
 (1.77e-04) (1.07e-04) (1.54e-04) (8.33e-5) (1.38e-04) (7.19e-5) (9.04e-5) (6.12e-05) 
land 0.0101
***
 0.0117
***
 0.0124
***
 0.0132
***
 0.0146
***
 0.0150
***
 0.0145
***
 0.0153
***
 
 (0.000893) (0.000496) (0.000706) (0.000455) (0.000877) (0.000525) (0.000601) (0.000555) 
labour 0.357
***
 0.343
***
 0.256
***
 0.232
***
 0.174
***
 0.164
***
 0.173
***
 0.144
***
 
 (0.0349) (0.0203) (0.0280) (0.0194) (0.0329) (0.0224) (0.0291) (0.0217) 
teagasc 0.277
***
 0.178
***
 0.139
***
 0.113
***
 0.211
***
  0.0246
+
 0.155
***
 
 (0.0395) (0.0215) (0.0286) (0.0218) (0.0328)  (0.0285) (0.0230) 
REPS 0.185
**
 0.126
***
 0.190
***
 0.227
***
 0.317
***
 0.223
***
 0.226
***
 0.184
***
 
 (0.0708) (0.0332) (0.0409) (0.0275) (0.0451) (0.0304) (0.0334) (0.0278) 
Dairy&co -0.268
***
 -0.281
***
 -0.264
***
 -0.241
***
 -0.287
***
 -0.284
***
 -0.295
***
 -0.289
***
 
 (0.0597) (0.0326) (0.0413) (0.0308) (0.0467) (0.0343) (0.0393) (0.0399) 
Cattle -0.909
***
 -0.794
***
 -0.866
***
 -0.865
***
 -1.030
***
 -1.013
***
 -1.086
***
 -0.966
***
 
 (0.0766) (0.0379) (0.0518) (0.0361) (0.0554) (0.0360) (0.0412) (0.0366) 
Cattle&co -0.828
***
 -0.872
***
 -0.934
***
 -0.881
***
 -0.977
***
 -1.043
***
 -1.064
***
 -0.878
***
 
 (0.0588) (0.0316) (0.0501) (0.0338) (0.0566) (0.0385) (0.0549) (0.0413) 
Sheep -0.838
***
 -0.818
***
 -0.754
***
 -0.852
***
 -0.955
***
 -1.030
***
 -0.964
***
 -0.761
***
 
 (0.0667) (0.0357) (0.0553) (0.0435) (0.0638) (0.0484) (0.0580) (0.0440) 
Tillage -0.339
***
 -0.343
***
 -0.574
***
 -0.582
***
 -0.575
***
 -0.584
***
 -0.699
***
 -0.666
***
 
 (0.0710) (0.0404) (0.0639) (0.0412) (0.0691) (0.0491) (0.0470) (0.0466) 
soil2 -0.169
***
 -0.159
***
 -0.118
***
 -0.102
***
 -0.179
***
 -0.192
***
 -0.188
***
 -0.169
***
 
 (0.0416) (0.0238) (0.0331) (0.0233) (0.0355) (0.0258) (0.0278) (0.0267) 
soil3 -0.490
***
 -0.473
***
 -0.418
***
 -0.423
***
 -0.384
***
 -0.400
***
 -0.419
***
 -0.323
***
 
 (0.0699) (0.0412) (0.0524) (0.0429) (0.0564) (0.0451) (0.0490) (0.0432) 
divers 0.335
**
 0.312
***
 0.0402
+
 -0.0254
+
 -0.0531
+
 0.139
+
 -0.187
+
 -0.169
+
 
 (0.124) (0.0670) (0.102) (0.0682) (0.107) (0.0752) (0.0966) (0.0866) 
variance  -0.0490
+
 -0.722
+
 0.122
+
 0.640
+
 -0.152
+
 -0.0196 -0.575
***
 
  (0.0627) (0.390) (0.0765) (0.682) (0.102) (0.306) (0.136) 
skewness  1.750
***
 0.433
+
 1.864
***
 1.135
+
 1.615
***
 4.177
***
 2.260
***
 
  (0.0709) (0.698) (0.0901) (1.124) (0.115) (0.659) (0.188) 
Dublin   0.123
+
 0.0712
+
 0.150
+
 0.346
**
 0.440
***
 0.293
**
 
   (0.166) (0.0837) (0.146) (0.118) (0.129) (0.0919) 
Mid-East   0.230
***
 0.357
***
 0.367
***
 0.308
***
 0.236
***
 0.289
***
 
   (0.0608) (0.0411) (0.0643) (0.0455) (0.0490) (0.0447) 
Midlands   0.146
*
 0.164
***
 0.0561
+
 0.0759
+
 0.132
*
 0.119
**
 
   (0.0577) (0.0399) (0.0673) (0.0468) (0.0538) (0.0432) 
Mid-West   0.0818
+
 0.0947
*
 0.0370
+
 0.0198
+
 0.0124
+
 0.0000651 
   (0.0518) (0.0416) (0.0635) (0.0462) (0.0482) (0.0414) 
South-East   0.151
**
 0.227
***
 0.219
***
 0.239
***
 0.169
***
 0.134
**
 
   (0.0531) (0.0345) (0.0600) (0.0402) (0.0458) (0.0435) 
SouthWest   0.115
*
 0.150
***
 0.132
*
 0.162
***
 0.0846
*
 0.135
**
 
   (0.0497) (0.0359) (0.0543) (0.0386) (0.0422) (0.0409) 
West   0.0499
+
 0.136
***
 0.0605
+
 0.0747
*
 0.156
***
 0.0909
*
 
   (0.0494) (0.0353) (0.0600) (0.0378) (0.0444) (0.0410) 
_cons 9.372
***
 9.424
***
 9.615
***
 9.552
***
 9.503
***
 9.681
***
 10.05
***
 9.888
***
 
 (0.0810) (0.0422) (0.0824) (0.0508) (0.0869) (0.0538) (0.0677) (0.0627) 
N 1066 1007 1015 928 924 934 990 964 
r2 0.722 0.884 0.792 0.895 0.784 0.887 0.850 0.871 
p 3.88e-248 0 5.03e-288 0 7.03e-270 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses;   
+
 p < .8, 
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001 
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Regression Results: 2003-2009 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) ln(GM) 
capital 3.96e-04
***
 3.45e-04
**
 1.62e-04
*
 1.53e-04
**
 1.18e-04
**
 8.25e-05
**
 1.32e-04
*
 
 (1.01e-04) (1.14e-04) (8.10e-05) (5.58e-05) (3.79e-05) (2.54e-05) (5.77e-05) 
land 0.0153
***
 0.0149
***
 0.0159
***
 0.0155
***
 0.0150
***
 0.0150
***
 0.0134
***
 
 (0.000601) (0.000571) (0.000480) (0.000429) (0.000527) (0.000461) (0.000575) 
labour 0.158
***
 0.218
***
 0.184
***
 0.167
***
 0.190
***
 0.174
***
 0.198
***
 
 (0.0278) (0.0353) (0.0244) (0.0222) (0.0242) (0.0222) (0.0285) 
teagasc 0.108
***
 0.0950
***
 0.121
***
 0.158
***
 0.158
***
 0.139
***
 0.0956
***
 
 (0.0223) (0.0241) (0.0246) (0.0208) (0.0277) (0.0232) (0.0273) 
REPS 0.306
***
 0.371
***
 0.312
***
 0.294
***
 0.311
***
 0.342
***
 0.301
***
 
 (0.0325) (0.0331) (0.0290) (0.0211) (0.0263) (0.0238) (0.0272) 
Dairy&co -0.261
***
 -0.312
***
 -0.221
***
 -0.224
***
 -0.273
***
 -0.196
***
 -0.149
*
 
 (0.0436) (0.0444) (0.0518) (0.0415) (0.0575) (0.0525) (0.0616) 
Cattle -0.918
***
 -1.043
***
 -0.727
***
 -0.588
***
 -0.754
***
 -0.596
***
 -0.335
***
 
 (0.0401) (0.0391) (0.0509) (0.0504) (0.0664) (0.0539) (0.0533) 
Cattle&co -0.870
***
 -1.038
***
 -0.632
***
 -0.456
***
 -0.673
***
 -0.529
***
 -0.347
***
 
 (0.0421) (0.0447) (0.0506) (0.0456) (0.0647) (0.0537) (0.0555) 
Sheep -0.669
***
 -0.804
***
 -0.638
***
 -0.491
***
 -0.695
***
 -0.620
***
 -0.391
***
 
 (0.0449) (0.0464) (0.0594) (0.0518) (0.0716) (0.0618) (0.0629) 
Tillage -0.631
***
 -0.677
***
 -0.443
***
 -0.306
***
 -0.321
***
 -0.325
***
 -0.301
***
 
 (0.0539) (0.0559) (0.0619) (0.0483) (0.0559) (0.0540) (0.0658) 
soil2 -0.142
***
 -0.128
***
 -0.114
***
 -0.0947
***
 -0.0969
***
 -0.132
***
 -0.115
***
 
 (0.0272) (0.0282) (0.0261) (0.0218) (0.0262) (0.0233) (0.0311) 
soil3 -0.235
***
 -0.247
***
 -0.316
***
 -0.284
***
 -0.254
***
 -0.265
***
 -0.259
***
 
 (0.0403) (0.0441) (0.0523) (0.0434) (0.0487) (0.0400) (0.0537) 
divers -0.416
***
 -0.523
***
 -0.675
***
 -0.945
***
 -1.036
***
 -1.212
***
 -1.144
***
 
 (0.0936) (0.0946) (0.145) (0.131) (0.144) (0.128) (0.163) 
variance 0.571
*
 -0.247
+
 -0.394
+
 -1.611
**
 -0.631
***
 -2.072
***
 -0.913
***
 
 (0.254) (0.186) (0.309) (0.536) (0.149) (0.509) (0.212) 
skewness 2.515
***
 2.096
***
 3.019
***
 -0.301
+
 1.263
***
 -1.197
+
 1.954
***
 
 (0.440) (0.271) (0.614) (0.698) (0.197) (0.624) (0.372) 
Dublin 0.228
*
 0.522
**
  -0.118
+
 -0.0186   
 (0.104) (0.186)  (0.108) (0.115)   
Mid-East 0.237
***
 0.198
***
 0.0727
+
 0.0654
+
 0.0462
+
   
 (0.0443) (0.0499) (0.0440) (0.0434) (0.0511)   
Midlands 0.148
**
 0.138
**
 0.0397
+
 0.0115
+
 0.0822
*
   
 (0.0457) (0.0479) (0.0467) (0.0395) (0.0413)   
Mid-West -0.00670 -0.0267
+
 -0.0349
+
 0.0144
+
 0.0226
+
   
 (0.0465) (0.0468) (0.0417) (0.0380) (0.0456)   
South-East 0.0798
+
 0.0832
*
 0.0813
+
 0.0884
**
 0.0909
*
   
 (0.0411) (0.0423) (0.0447) (0.0309) (0.0395)   
SouthWest 0.118
**
 0.0772
*
 0.0196
+
 -0.0231
+
 0.00764   
 (0.0420) (0.0390) (0.0390) (0.0319) (0.0393)   
West 0.0720
+
 0.0124
+
 -0.0572
+
 -0.0606
+
 0.00562   
 (0.0398) (0.0411) (0.0409) (0.0329) (0.0425)   
_cons 9.891
***
 10.03
***
 10.34
***
 10.58
***
 10.69
***
 10.90
***
 10.67
***
 
 (0.0669) (0.0674) (0.103) (0.101) (0.0939) (0.0797) (0.127) 
N 1001 999 905 817 796 712 552 
r2 0.859 0.868 0.871 0.917 0.899 0.913 0.872 
p 0 0 0 0 0.899 0.913 1.98e-212 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
+
 p < .8, 
*
 p < .05, 
**
 p < .01, 
***
 p < .001 
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APPENDIX E: FACTORS’ CONTRIBUTION TO CURRENT YEAR INEQUALITY 
 Factors' Contribution to Current Year Inequality 
 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Capital 4.75% 2.30% 3.01% 1.64% 3.09% 3.58% 2.13% 1.16% 2.84% 2.71% 1.46% 1.44% 1.81% 1.92% 2.29% 
Land 30.07% 30.31% 38.27% 35.56% 39.11% 40.32% 39.67% 44.67% 44.01% 40.81% 48.46% 43.97% 40.15% 42.03% 46.62% 
Labour 23.56% 20.73% 17.20% 12.45% 9.20% 8.10% 9.17% 7.31% 7.60% 10.28% 9.01% 7.70% 7.80% 7.82% 11.15% 
Teagasc 7.21% 3.95% 3.66% 2.95% 5.54% 
 
0.50% 3.57% 2.42% 2.00% 2.68% 3.85% 3.60% 2.78% 2.11% 
REPS 0.27% 0.00% -0.23% -0.49% -0.80% -1.50% -1.19% -0.93% -1.60% -1.32% -1.14% -0.26% -0.73% -0.18% 1.18% 
Dairy&co -3.72% -3.23% -4.17% -3.43% -4.74% -3.74% -3.29% -3.52% -2.58% -2.89% -2.34% -2.04% -1.59% -1.12% -1.01% 
Cattle 12.14% 6.88% 17.65% 15.85% 22.66% 19.71% 25.11% 25.05% 21.00% 23.52% 17.46% 12.45% 14.27% 11.30% 6.51% 
Cattle&co 12.34% 16.50% 14.83% 11.25% 12.97% 12.94% 13.23% 9.58% 12.35% 13.35% 7.59% 6.30% 10.07% 6.88% 4.93% 
Sheep 6.08% 5.71% 4.87% 6.10% 6.31% 8.81% 5.50% 3.07% 2.93% 3.29% 2.48% 1.89% 3.14% 3.36% 2.23% 
Tillage -2.31% -1.65% -3.47% -2.73% -2.35% -3.11% -3.58% -3.42% -3.60% -3.56% -1.54% -1.26% -1.33% -1.14% -1.17% 
Soil2 1.30% 1.40% 1.38% 1.07% 2.33% 2.74% 2.78% 2.58% 1.87% 1.37% 1.24% 1.02% 0.94% 1.13% 1.32% 
Soil3 5.32% 3.43% 3.38% 2.57% 2.22% 2.16% 1.84% 1.13% 1.20% 1.35% 1.92% 1.16% 1.16% 1.54% 1.89% 
Diversification 3.00% 2.49% 0.36% -0.11% -0.13% 0.57% 0.83% 0.64% 2.13% 2.47% 4.98% 9.41% 13.56% 14.48% 9.94% 
Variance 
 
-0.05% 0.11% -0.17% -0.27% -0.37% 0.01% 0.44% -0.84% 0.07% 0.07% 14.83% 2.32% 16.99% 5.20% 
Skewness 
 
11.21% 0.26% 14.34% 0.59% 5.67% 5.82% 5.58% 8.01% 3.91% 5.71% -2.00% 3.88% -7.80% 6.81% 
Dublin 
  
0.01% 0.01% 0.05% 0.35% 0.17% -0.06% 0.19% 0.47% 
 
-0.07% 0.00% 
  Mid-East 
  
1.68% 2.31% 2.44% 1.77% 1.17% 2.23% 1.53% 1.05% 0.37% 0.28% 0.16% 
  Midlands 
  
0.03% -0.17% -0.08% 0.11% 0.26% 0.03% 0.12% 0.11% 0.02% 0.02% 0.14% 
  Mid-West 
  
-0.10% -0.07% -0.07% -0.03% -0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.08% 0.13% -0.05% -0.01% 
  South-East 
  
1.15% 1.71% 1.85% 1.61% 1.16% 1.08% 0.55% 0.56% 0.62% 0.75% 0.67% 
  South West 
  
0.76% 0.74% 1.11% 1.27% 0.62% 1.00% 0.72% 0.52% 0.13% -0.12% 0.03% 
  West 
  
-0.65% -1.38% -0.77% -0.95% -1.87% -1.18% -0.86% -0.16% 0.71% 0.74% -0.06% 
  Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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APPENDIX F: FACTORS’ CONTRIBUTION TO NEXT YEAR INEQUALITY 
  
Impact of Each Year on Next Year Inequality    
  96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 
Gini Index % 
Change -4.1% -0.5% 5.8% -4.2% 0.8% 1.6% 1.2% 3.9% -4.2% 1.9% 5.6% 1.5% -6.2% 
Capital -21% 252% 27% -5% 20% -192% 186% -11% 17% -2% -12% 3% -13% 
Land -194% 732% 142% 66% 25% 300% 204% -153% -272% -330% -60% 239% 28% 
Labour 96% 1271% -14% 68% 226% -86% 67% 46% 39% -105% 16% 30% -35% 
REPS 7% 19% -9% 10% -25% 27% -74% 18% 3% 52% -8% 61% -18% 
Dairy&co 21% -81% -21% -19% 75% -4% 87% -11% -13% 27% 9% 4% -3% 
Cattle -260% 533% 157% 99% 722% -23% -212% 24% 126% -249% 19% 21% 73% 
Cattle&co 79% 594% 52% 31% 87% -226% 273% 15% 157% -56% 75% -227% 14% 
Sheep 23% -134% 29% -20% -415% -148% 6% 14% 12% -31% 18% 34% 24% 
Tillage 43% -156% 2% 5% -74% -6% -35% -1% -56% 10% -9% 22% 2% 
Soil2 -10% 50% 23% -7% -47% 12% -36% -15% 2% -7% -3% -11% -1% 
Soil3 -1% 190% -5% 8% -19% -57% 22% 10% -7% -27% 4% 16% -6% 
Diversification 43% 33% -5% -16% 83% -29% 143% -5% -75% 342% 76% 31% 91% 
Variance -6% 71% -9% -5% 65% 16% -14% -6% -52% 97% 102% -158% 74% 
Skewness 278% -3274% -270% -115% -625% 515% -518% 175% 220% 380% -127% 36% -128% 
Sum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
23 
 
APPENDIX G: SOURCE OF CHANGE IN INEQUALITY WEIGHTS (METHODE 2) 
  
Capital Land Labour Teagasc REPS Dairy
&co 
Cattle Cattle
&co 
Sheep Tillage Soil2 Soil3 Diversif
ication 
Variance Skewness 
1
9
9
6
-1
9
9
7
 β 145% 64% 95% 114% 78% -164% 20% -69% 39% 95% 111% 86% 99% 101% 98% 
σ(var) -75% 2% 16% 0% 16% 181% 73% 200% 76% -1% 1% 36% 2% -2% 4% 
σ(GM) -30% -34% 10% 14% -6% -84% -7% 31% 15% -6% 12% 22% 2% -1% 2% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1
9
9
7
-1
9
9
8
 β 121% 166% 71% 100% 68% 107% 3% 205% 105% 155% 99% -22% 100% 97% 106% 
σ(var) -21% -61% 28% 0% 33% -9% 90% -111% -3% -37% 0% 119% 0% 4% -6% 
σ(GM) 0% 4% -1% -1% 1% -2% -6% -5% 1% 18% -1% -3% 0% 0% 0% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1
9
9
8
-1
9
9
9
 β 113% 665% 76% 117% 121% 272% 119% 201% 1233% 6% 120% 58% 104% 112% 69% 
σ(var) 8% 48% 0% 0% 12% -32% 44% 77% -135% 48% 0% -13% 9% -5% 18% 
σ(GM) 21% 613% -24% 17% 34% 141% 63% 178% 998% -46% 20% -55% 13% 6% -13% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1
9
9
9
-2
0
0
0
 β -361% 34% 86% . 113% 48% -82% 73% 75% 25% 66% 53% 106% 94% 116% 
σ(var) 392% 9% 72% . 0% 192% -20% -17% -15% 7% -4% -3% -2% 3% -29% 
σ(GM) -69% -57% 59% . 13% 140% -202% -45% -40% -68% -38% -51% -4% 3% -13% 
TT 100% 100% 100% . 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
1
 β 104% 346% 107% . -22% -107% 177% -23% 52% 101% 37% -69% 131% 96% 110% 
σ(var) -12% -675% 80% . 66% 98% 30% 76% 15% 22% 0% 108% -57% 2% -5% 
σ(GM) -8% -429% 86% . -56% -108% 107% -48% -33% 24% -62% -62% 25% -2% 5% 
TT 100% 100% 100% . 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2
0
0
1
-2
0
0
2
 β 113% 58% 95% 97% 136% 49% 28480% 171% 123% -52% 177% 151% 163% 98% 116% 
σ(var) -4% -1% 28% 0% -8% 146% -17964% -33% -1% 105% -5% -26% 6% 0% -8% 
σ(GM) 9% -44% 23% -2% 28% 96% 10416% 38% 22% -47% 72% 25% 69% -1% 8% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Capital Land Labour Teagasc REPS Dairy
&co 
Cattle Cattle
&co 
Sheep Tillage Soil2 Soil3 Diversif
ication 
Variance Skewness 
2
0
0
2
-2
0
0
3
 β 124% 0% 2513% 93% 106% 62% 42% -24% 118% 57% 82% 106% 103% 53% -309% 
σ(var) -20% 363% -1643% 0% 0% 22% 36% 197% -43% 14% 5% -15% 0% 71% 330% 
σ(GM) 3% 263% 769% -7% 6% -16% -22% 73% -25% -29% -13% -9% 3% -24% -79% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2
0
0
3
-2
0
0
4
 β 215% 55% 101% 64% 135% 165% 145% 194% 239% 443% 60% 1526% 118% 106% 69% 
σ(var) -228% -97% 21% 0% 16% 0% 36% -15% -46% 113% 0% 780% 18% 1% 4% 
σ(GM) -113% -142% 22% -36% 51% 65% 81% 79% 93% 456% -40% 2207% 37% -8% -27% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2
0
0
4
-2
0
0
5
 β 125% 60% 132% 81% 265% 100% 133% 140% 129% 92% 273% 78% 276% 93% 93% 
σ(var) -14% -23% 20% -3% -62% 20% -9% -21% 8% 22% -8% 1% -249% -6% -10% 
σ(GM) 11% -63% 52% -22% 103% 19% 25% 19% 37% 15% 165% -21% -72% -13% -17% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2
0
0
5
-2
0
0
6
 β -120% 61% 69% 113% 120% -93% 79% 109% 91% 110% 91% 45% 103% 102% 102% 
σ(var) 260% -13% 18% -5% -58% 63% 14% -15% 2% -16% 0% 47% 3% 0% -1% 
σ(GM) 40% -53% -13% 8% -38% -130% -7% -6% -6% -6% -9% -8% 6% 1% -1% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2
0
0
6
-2
0
0
7
 β -252% 47% 185% 1% -338% 1434% 141% 106% 120% 308% -46% 61% 50% 91% 98% 
σ(var) 420% -38% 14% 33% -1% -827% -2% 13% 4% 242% 6% 2% 88% 2% -3% 
σ(GM) 68% -90% 99% -66% -438% 507% 40% 19% 24% 450% -140% -37% 38% -7% 5% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2
0
0
7
-2
0
0
8
 β -268% 17% 127% 168% 83% 91% 153% 104% 89% 22% 93% 44% 119% 103% 13% 
σ(var) 352% 14% 3% -42% -1% 15% -40% 5% 27% 40% 1% 35% -34% -4% 66% 
σ(GM) -15% -69% 30% 26% -18% 6% 13% 9% 16% -38% -6% -21% -16% -2% 21% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2
0
0
8
-2
0
0
9
 β 4151% -342% 48% 144% 473% 125% 119% 122% 135% 217% 383% -68% 27% 103% 150% 
σ(var) -4935% 154% 14% -5% -6% 19% 1% 7% -5% 159% -4% -143% 119% 10% -28% 
σ(GM) -884% -289% -37% 38% 366% 45% 21% 29% 29% 276% 278% -311% 46% 12% -22% 
TT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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